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Introduction
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 (The Act) radically reformed bargaining in New Zealand replacing the traditional system of collective bargaining developed over a century with one that emphasised .,free .. bargaining. While a measure of consensus developed on the new bargaining regime, the future role and structure of the specialist legal institutions continued to be a source of contentious debate.
Proponents of a specialist jurisdiction argued that the employment relationship was not simply another form of commẽrcial contract, maintaining the Act was fundamentally flawed because it failed to acknowledge the inherent disparity of bargaining power between employer and employee. To redress the power imbalance, they called for the retention of a specialist jurisdiction claim.ing it was necessary to ensure the effective managem, ent of inevitable conflict.
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Opponents of a specialist jurisdiction on the other hand argued that the ẽmployment contract was lik· e any other contract, based on market exchange, and should be dealt with by courts of general jurisdiction. They contẽnded that judicial intervention was philosophically inconsistent with the free market principles underpinning the Act. Under a derẽgulated system of free bargaining they claimed that the market would replace the courts as the sole arbiter of justice and, "lead to New . Zealand joining the powerhouse ẽconomies of the world and bring true democracy to workplaces" (National Party, 1991) .
The Act etnerged as an inevitable compromise. The free bargaining framework advocated by the Business Roundtable and Treasury was adopted but their preferred institutional structures were rejected. A specialist employment jurisdiction survived albeit in a different guise.
Under the revan1ped specialist jurisdiction, the "new" legal institutions emerged with a radically r· edefined role. The emphasis on entẽrprise bargaining and mutual resolution of disputes between parties meant that the legal institutions no longer played a pivotal role in the bargaining process, ẽnsuring equitable employment relations and providing protection Cor the parties. Instead the Act relegated them to a residual role of resolving disputes and differences arising from the breakdown of employment relations.
Early dẽcisions under thẽ Act signalled that the ''new" legal institutions intended to take a cautious approach. In Adams v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Limited [1992] 1 ERNZ 982 the Employment Court made its intention clear not to intervene in the bargaining process stating, "the Act is quite specific as to the conduct which is prohibited and the Court is not justified in putting a gloss on the Act by importing a requirement nowhere exprẽssed in it" (989, 1022-23) However, faced with increasingly problematic bargaining provisions that were incomplete, inconsistent or invisible, and incidents of bargaining practices that were the antithẽsis of playing fair "leading to unrest and disharmony and erosion of mutual trust and confidence thus producing an inefficient labour market and defeating the objects of the Employment Contracts
Act 1991" (Service Workers Union of Aotearoa Inc. v Southern P, acific Hotel Co1poration [ 1993] 2 ERNZ 513) the legal institutions had little option but to inteiVene.
Five years on the legal institutions have been forced to adopt an increasingly interventionist role by: · establishing duties to ensure recognition of bargaining agents, defining negotiation and reintroducing tl1e requirement for parties to bargaining in good faith . The alleged move towards "judicial activism" has led to intense criticism from employer and business groups who call for the abolition of the specialist jurisdiction and a return to common law and commonsense. Critics claim that the Act' s intention to radically reshape the labour market is being sabotaged by these institutions who persist, against Parliament, s intention, to interpret the Act as if the changes it made to the law were minimal (Howard, 1995 : 1 ) . Supporters of inteiVention, however, praise judicial activisn1 asserting that the specialist legal institutions were the saviours of the system.
Amidst this continuing debate it is tin1ely to ẽxamine the role of the "new" Jegal institutions and to assess their impact on bargaining under the Act through an analysis of the emerging case law. an employee or employer has authorised a person, group, or organisation to represent the employee or employer in negotiations for an employment contract, the employee or employer with whom the negotiations arẽ being undertaken shall, subject to s.ll of this Act, recognise the authority of that person, gfOup or organisation to represent the entployee or entployer in those negotiations.
Again this section fails to define recognition. Further complications arise where em.ployers are obligated to recognise an authorised bargaining representative but are under no statutory obligation to negotiate with them. Just what practical assistance this would be to the process of bargaining was unclear.
The issue of access for bargaining representatives presented the institutions with another set of problems. While an authorised bargaining represẽntative has a statutory right of access for the purpose of obtaining authority to act as a representative, rights of access for the purpose Lorra. ine Skiffington of negotiation are restricted to negotiations with "an employee"' and are required to be at, "a reasonable titne. n Legal institutions were left the task of developing a working definition of reasonableness to facilitate the bargaining process. This is however nothing new. Statutes are frequently dratted as bare legislative frameworks leaving the development of detail up to the judiciary. Over the last five years, the interpretation of sections that provide only minimal statutory guidelines and draDting anomalies has resulted in a growing volume of controversial case law. Key issues regarding bargaining wiH be discussed as follows. w · hile s.l4 establishes the right of access for bargaining representatives, employers have considerable control over the actual terms of the access. In Alliance Textiles the employer granted access at 6am in the morning and then only after trying to convince their employees to rescind the authority they had given to the representative. Similarly in Argyle Hospital the employẽr only allowed the union representative the opportunity to speak to an employee in the corridor amidst the general flurry of workplace activity. Section 14 places ~urther restrictions on representatives' freedom to bargain by only permitting access for the purpose of discussing an employment contract. This effectively barred union acoess to the workplace to discuss with their men1bers a range of other significant issues such education and training, leading to the criticism that the Act is highly selectiv· e about the fre· edoms it affords.
Choice of rẽpresẽntation
Early case law emphasised that while the Act establishes a right of access for bargaining representativẽs, this right is limited, reinforcing the underlying presumption that the workplace is the private property of the employer. While lẽgal institutions maintained a strict adherence to the Act, limiting bargaining representatives' rights to the letter of the law, this contrasted starkly with the discretion afforded to employers under the Act who are giv· en every necessary mechanism to control employmẽnt contracting at the enterprise level. It is not difficult to conclude therefore that thẽ difficult process of gaining authority, recognition, and then access was devis· ed as a deterrent to collective bargaining, where in practice bargaining representatives were all but banned from the workplace.
Rights of , access revisited
The parameters of rights of access were comprehensively reviewẽd in Service Workers Union of New Zealand Aotearoa Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Cotp (NZ) Ltd {1993} 2 ERNZ 531. In this case employees sought compliance orders to .restrain an employer from imposing restrictions on a union's entry and access to its members. The e1nployer maintained that the peculiar nature of the industry and the requirement of health and safety procedures precluded any access to the work premises. Mter an examination of the statutory limitations on the right of entry, the Employment · Court found that under s.l4(2) the employer had to show that procedures or requirements existed relating to health and safety and that they were rẽasonable, and limited or prohibited the entry of persons other than employees. The Employment court found that s.l4 did impose restrictions on the representatives roan1ing at large through an employer's prẽmises by requiring them to report on arrival and adhere to relevant health and safety regulations. However it concluded that \vhere there is a right of entry and the exercise of the right is Inet with conditions or restrictions which are not authorised, then the right is as good as denied. To delay entry, to surround it \Vith conditions of the en1ployer' s invention, and to i1npeded it is to refuse entry in breach of the prohibition in s.14(5). (531, 532) Rights of access undẽr s.l4 were further clarifi· ed by the Court of Appeal in Foodstuffs (Auckland) Ltd v National Distribution Union Inc [1995] The case is signjficant because for the first time the Court of Appeal recognised that the right of access included collective elements. Contrary to previous case law, the Court of Appeal had no difficulty irr establishing that access was not restricted to individual negotiations but covered collective arrangements. Importantly the case reaffi11ned that employees have the right of freedom of association and representation and the Act should be interpreted by the courts to support these choices. Furthermore the Court of Appeal noted that s.l4 rights were statutory and could not be contracted away.
Payment of stopwork meetings was also addressed in Foodstuffs. The Court of Appeal noted that stopwork meetings to discuss contract negotiations were most likely to be held during working time and concluded that:
it could hardly have b, een intended that pay should be deducted for any tin1e ho,vever short, during which an individual stops what he or she is doing, or that it should be reduced 'vhile the individual \vorks more slovvly, during tbe discussion (280, 284).
The judgment stressed that "the Court must lean away from any construction that creates a disincentive to the exercise of the right of choice and representation" (280, 284). The Court made it clear that such a disincentive would follow from a deduction in pay whatever the tern1s of the employment contract.
The Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that bargaining access was governed by the overriding principle of reasonableness, pointing out "it is a matter of strikin.g a fair balance between the employer's interests and those of the employees and their representatives." It was unwilling, howevẽr, to define what constitutes reasonableness but instead, identified several factors to be considered when determining reasonableness. Thesẽ included: the d, egree of disruption anticipated, length of meeting time, frequency of entry requests, timing of request and prior notice. This test of reasonablenẽss applies to both employers and bargaining representatives. In Skellerup l11dustries Ltd v NZ Rubber Workers U11ion [1992] I ERNZ 477 it was held that an employẽr was not givẽn reasonable notice of a meeting which halted production. Similarly in Foodstuffs the Court of Appeal held that it was not reasonable to have on-going rights of access for negotiation once a contract had been concluded. Employers cannot, however, lawfully prevent authorised representatives from entering thẽ workplace to discuss collectivẽ negotiations with their employees even if they subsequently sign individual contracts but do not withdraw the reprẽsentative's bargaining authority.
Ratification
A conoern under the previous system of centralisẽd collective bargaining was that parties werẽ rarely consultẽd and therefore had little control over the outcomes of award negotiations. In an attempt to address this deficiency, the Act included a mandatory ratification clause, intended to ensure that both parties understood and agreed to the terms of the contract.
Section 16 stipulates that a ratification procedure must be in place three months prior to the commencement of negotiations. The details of the procedure are left to the discretion of the bargaining represẽntative and those to be represented. The Act is silent on the role of employers in ratification and fails to provide protection against the undermining of the ratification process . Thẽse procedures were left for the legal institutions to develop.
The early cases dealing with ratification followed a strict interprẽtation of s.16 noting that the agreed ratification procedure is binding. In Grut v Downer Mining (1992] 1 ERNZ 982 the union clain1ed that the employer had breached the agreed ratification process by talking directly with employees. The Employment Court held that this was permissible although it emphasised that the ratification process was strictly a matter between the union and its members.
In Shannon v l)acer Kerridge Cinemas Limited (1992] 3 ERN. Z 742 it was held that once a contract is ratified, it will be upheld even if the employees subsequently withdraw their authorisation in an effort to invalidate it. In this case, the union agreed to drastic cuts in the wages of ẽmployees and ratified thẽ contract without fully inforn1ing them at a ratification meeting. By the time the employees leamẽd of this and withdrew their authorisation, the union confirmed with the employer that the contract had been ratified . (unreported, AET 880/92) where an employer acted on a ratified contract that employees subsequently tried to overturn by resigning from the union . The etnployer claimed that employees were estopped from denying the authority of the union to act on their behalf, notwithstanding the lack of ratification procedure. The case was, however, withdrawn before the Court could resolve the issue because of the employer dẽsire to preserve an amicable working relationship which took precedence over any potential benefit of succeeding in an action on a legal technicality.
Similar circumstances arose in Butters v Forestry Corporation of Ne1v Zealand Lintited
Both Butters and Shannon illustrate that while the ratification procedure is mandatory, without detailed provision to ensure its ẽnforcement the Act potentially increases the employer's ability to undermine collective contracting. Where the A. ct is silent, the Courts had little option but to reinforce the sanctity of a concluded contract and to give full weight to it.
Subsequent case law has, however, modified this approach where the legal institutions have taken the view that attempts to influence the ratification procedure rnay breach s.12 and raises questions as to whether the employẽr is ẽxerting undue influence and is therefore in breach of s.57. In NZ Engineering Union Inc and Ors v Shell Todd [1994] 2 ERNZ 546, an employer attempted to withdraw from a settlement (prior to ratification) after discovering it had made an error by agreeing to a clause. The Employment Court held that pending ratification, "the employer cannot resile from its comn1itment, for it is inherent in s.I6 that what is put forward for ratification is the settlement reached and not something else." The Employment Court concluded that it was not open to the employer to deprive ẽmployees of the opportunity to ratify the settlement by simply changing its n1ind .
• Attempts to alter settlements aft, er ratification were also addressed in Arn1strong v Attorne;'-, General [1 995] proposed settlement is reached it binds both parties subject to ratification, adding that the contract is made at the time of settlement.
Since the passing of the Act, legal institutions have progressed some way towards establishing a framework of ratification that balances the competing interẽsts of employer, employees and bargaining representatives, while at the same time avoiding compromisin, g the intention of the Act.
The process of negotiation
In contrast to previous legislation which imposed a highly regulated collective framework for contract negotiation, the Act fails to establish any substantive process for negotiation. As stated in Bucha11ar1 v Rodney District Council [1992] 2 ERNZ 578:
The Act generally contemplates that there will be negotiation. There are h0\\ 1 ever no rules or other practical provisions indicating ho\V, when, "'here and for ho\\' long. The only aspects clearly covered are \Vith \vhonl the negotiation process should be conducted. There is no longer a legitimate exllectation of negotiation (578, 585) .
When negotiation does take place, there is no statutory requirement that it be carried out fairly, an important consideration when employees, without the eollective strength of their union, may be at a disadvantage in their bargaining position. As Keily and Caisley (Harbridge, 1993: (ii) inoorporating substantial duties into tlte obligation to recognise the bargaining agent (iii) defming negotiation to include some element of compron1ise.
The initial case law indicated, however, that the Courts were reluctant to impose such an interpretation on the Act.
The issue of negotiating in good faith was debated at length by the Employment Court in Alliance TextilesJ wherẽ an employer who recognised the union as a bargaining rẽpresentative subsequently discouraged workers from enlisting its services and obstructed the union's attempts to negotiate. The central question for the Court was whether the employer's tactics amounted to harsh and oppressive behaviour, or involved undue influence or duress for the purpos, es of s.57 of the Act.
Due to the uncharacteristically high criminal burden of proof required to establish harsh and oppressive behaviour und, er the Act, the Employment Court noted that the notoriously robust exchanges typical of the New Zealand industrial relations scene, though unfortunately confrontational, is still the style in which many employers and employees do business with each other. Reluctant to inteiVene, the Employment Court stated:
The Act is quite specific as to the conduct \vbich is prohibited and t11e Court is not justified in putting a gloss on the Act by itnporting a requirement nowhere ex-pressed in it, that tlte employer should ren1ain neutral when its vital interests are affected and tnaintain in that situation a 'hands-off' stance (982, 1023).
Attempts to impose an obligation on employers to negotiate with bargaining representatives in good faith continued to fail, with the legal institutions taking a narrow interpretation that an employer was under no obligation to negotiate at all . Case law illustrates that if an employer did agree to negotiate, they were under no obligation to compromise. This was apparent in Skellerup where it was held that the Act enables an employer, without any prior negotiations, to present an othetwise lawful collective employment contract to its employees and insist that, unless thẽy accept its terms within a prescribed timẽ, they would be locked out. In this case, the Employment Court conceded that in response to the use of a lawful lockout during negotiations, employees could strike. tl1ere is an intplied term in evel)' en1ployrnent contract that the eo1ployers V.'ill not, \vithout reasonable and proper cause, conduct then1selves in a n1anner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust betv~'een tlte etnployer and employee (711 , 715). [1993] 2 ERNZ 360 which involved a dispute over an en1ployer's unilateral decision to terminate association with the ẽmployee's union. In this case, Hardie Boys J described the Act as," not anti-union but may fairly be described as union neutral" (360, 370) . This position was £urther endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Eke tone v Alliance Textiles (NZ) l.Jtd [ 1993] 2 ERNZ 786 where Cooke, P concurrẽd that the Act is union neutral but went on to point out "there was no requirement for employers to be union neutral" (786, 787) . This case was the long awaited appeal from Alliance Textiles which proved to be a n1ajor turning point in the development of bargaining case law.
The issue resurfaced in United Food & Chemical Workers Union of NZ v ]alley
It was not until two years after tl1e Emp. loyment Court delivered the Alliance Textiles decision that the Court of Appeal finally addressed the questions of law on appeal. The appeal concluded that after such a delay no live issues re1nained to be resoJved between the parties, the contract having expired and been replaced. Th, e judgment however made important obiter con1ments, clarifying the fundamental rights and responsibilities of the en1ployer and employee in the negoti.ation process. given meaning consistent with freedom of association as internationally recognised" (786, 795) . Notwithstanding these comments were obiter, they marked a significant shift in the legal institutions' interpretation of the Act from a narrow to a broad, holistic approach.
A new era of holistic interprẽtation
A new era of holistic interpretation was confirmed by the Employment Court's decision in A'Z Medical Laboratory Workers. In this case an employer attempted to by-pass the authorised bargaining representative by circulating material about a new collective contracting policy directly to employees and by arranging meetings without first informing or inviting the union. The union sought a number of remedies including: declarations as to the legality of the employer's actions and a pertnanent injunction preventing intenerence with the union's bargaining authority. The employer argued that the freedom of expression granted by s.14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 allowed it to communicate directly with its employees. The union however maintained that any direct approach to employees who had authorised a bargaining representative was a direct contravention of s.l2 of the Act.
From the outset the Employment Court made its intention clear that it would adopt the principles established in Eketone~ statin, g:
that it did not agree that the observations in Eketone could be seen as obiter and therefore gratuitous. The vie'"'S were expressed in an official judgment of tlle Court of f\ppeal witl1 the concurrence of a full bench of five judges. The statements made indicate the likely line of policy to be adopted by the Court of Appeal in the future (123, (124) (125) .
e.al
In reaching its decision the Employment Court examined competing sections of the New es. The En1ployment Court concluded that not all direct approaches to employees or attempts at persuasion breach s.l2 unless the motive or intention li'as to undermi11e the authorised representative. In this particular case, the Employment Court found that a letter issuing conditional suspension notices in the context of a proposed strike was a conscious attempt to negotiate directly with employees and to intẽrferẽ with intended strike action. This amounted to a breach of s.l2(2) and the defendant's obligations of trust and confidence and its statutory good employer obligations. Accordingly the Employment Court issu, ed a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from any conduct, including communications to its employees, that breached its duty to recognise thẽ union)s authority to represent its members.
Capital Coast Health appealed the Employment Courfs finding in respect of four of the communications. Subsequently thẽ , Court of Appeal upheld the Etnployn1ent Court's decision on all but one communication which was in the form of a warning letter setting out the financial consequences of strike action. Acknowledging the difficulty of drawing the dividing linẽ bẽtween informing and warning (which is permissible) and threatening (which is not permissible), the Court. concluded in this case that a communication setting out the legitimate steps an employer intends to take to minimise the cost of a strike, prior to strike action) was lawful.
Despite criticisn1 during this case that such a broad approach increased the complexity of legal problems, leading to· legal tests that unduly restricted the freedoms intended by the Act, the Court of Appeal remained committed to the approach established in ~K.etone stating:
Tite Act n1ust be seen as essentially practical legislation designed to deal \vitll everyday practical situations. It is not appropriate to subject it to esoteric analysis or dra\v fme distinctions in its application. It is a tnattẽr of striking a balance betvveen the co1npeting interests of the parties -those of the en1ployee under s.l4 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and those of tlle employee under s.l2 of tl1e En1ployntent Contracts Act 1991. It is not a case of one prevailing over the other, but of botl1 being given sensible and practical effect. Although this case failẽd to establish the dividing line on what constitutes behaviour that breaches s.l2(2), by defining negotiation and answering the pivotal question as to whether the provision of information by the employer directly to employees is pern1issible, it confirmed the emergence of a broader interpretation of the Act.
Communications with employees
The issue of communications during negotiations resurfaced in the widely publicised case of Jvamy and Õthers v New Ze; aland Fire Sen,ice [ 1995] once negotiations for an e1nployn1ent contract had begun through an authorised etnployees' representative, no further conununication on the subject oftl1e negotiations Should be addressed by the en1ployer except for those required by the Act such as notices for lockouts or suspension of striking employees (724, 766) .
The Employment Court further asserted that it must: be taken to be a trespass on the employees' freedon1 of association for the ẽn1ployer, "'bile negotiations are in progress, to seek to come bern'een the en1ployees and their representative by offering to employees arguments or inducements intended to have or having the effect of persuading the employees to act without waiting for advice from their representative or in disregard of that advice (724, 762).
The Employment Court justified its decision indicating that recent case law (Eketone and CaJJital Coast Health) meant the Court was less ready than before to support en1ployers' perceived right to communicate directly with employees after a bargaining representative bad been authorised. Furth> ermore, interpretation of employment disputes has extended to encompass the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Privacy i\.ct 1993. In particular the right to freedom of association established by s.17 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990 has reinforced the freedom of employees to choose a bargaining representative. Similarly the Privacy Act 1993 makes the release of employee's personal infortnation, such as rẽmuneration rates, by the employẽr in media campaigns unlawful unless they first obtain the employee's consent.
This dẽcision effectively imposed a blanket prohibition on communication regarding contract negotiation between an employer and its represented employees during contract negotiation. The decision sparked an outburst of criticism from employer groups who argued for their right to communicate directly with their employees. The judgment was seen as somewhat of a regression reminiscent of the uncompromising rigidities of the pre-Eketone era. Its impact was, however, short-lived. Within two months of the decision, Couling v Carter Holt Harve;; Ltd [ 1995] 2 ERNZ 13 7 sought to restore a balanced and commonsense approach to bargaining.
1-.,he decision in Couling successfully litted the blankẽt prohibition on comn1unication during negotiations by distinguishing Jvan1y on the facts before the Court. The case involved an action for a permanent injunction where an alleged breach of s.12 occurred during collective contract negotiations. The mill management were instructed to relay the company's view of its position in the contract negotiations if asked. It transpired that several management staff Lorrain, e Skiffington did in fact communicate the company's position during conversations, some of which was in response to questions by employ, ees while others were unsolicited .
The central issue for determination was whẽther the direct comn1unications by management to en1ployees constituted a refusal or failure by the company to recognise the authority of the union to represent the hourly paid employees during negotiations. During the judgment it was argued that such free and frank communications between management and employees were an established part of the workplace culture.
Noting that the Act does not define what constitutes a recognition of authority to represent under s.l2(2), the Court adopted a broad interpretation relying on the Act's objective to promote an efficient labour market and the principles stated in Eketone and Capital Coast Health. It concluded that the decision of lvamy did not extend the Jaw in relation to s. 1 2(2) of the Act. Colgan, J made it clear that a blanket prohibition on all direct communications between an employer and employees during contract negotiations would be unjust and impracticable. He concluded that ncommunications or information per s, e are not prohjbited by statute" (13 7, 155). Only negotiations that have the intention or effect of undermini11g the representative's authority will constitute a breach of s.12(2).
The Employn1ent Court accepted the defendant's submission that the intention of s. l2(2) in the case of communications with represented employees during negotiations is to inhibit or prevent destructive, unfair or misleading con1munications. The Court, however, cautioned that each case would turn on its facts and concluded in this particular case that '' 'the evidence does not satisfy me, on the balance of probabilities, that irrespective of motive there was an undermining or other failure or refusal to recognise the authority of th, e bargaining representatives" ( 13 7, 156 This case involved a union application for a permanent injunction to restrain an employer against communicating with employees and third parties during contract negotiations. The Employ1nent Court ordered permanent injunctions to stop the employer's communications where it could be ẽstablished they were intended to undermine the authorised representative. The Chief Judge held that while an employer had the right to , communicate with employees during contract negotiations it was not absolute. In this case several of the communications were found to be biased, slanted and not legitimate examples of the provision of factual information.
The approach taken in this case is consistent \:Vith that of the Court of Appeal in Capital Coast Health reaffirming the principle that each case must turn on its particular facts. During the decision the Chief Judge did however acknowledge the precarious legal position of the Employn1ent Court concluding: 
The role of the specialist institutions
There are several compelling reasons why a specialist jurisdiction should remain. An analysis of bargaining case law concludes that the much-vaunted era of "free bargaining" has led to workplace conflict which is costly and contrary to the Act's aims. Rather than playing the peripheral role envisaged by the Act, the new legal institutions have found themselves at the centre of bargaining conflict. Cognisant of their prescribed role under the Act, they were initially reluctant to intervene in the bargaining process. However, because the Act failed to provide the detailed provisions necessary to facilitate efficient bargaining, the legal institutions were lett with little alternative but to intercede. Contrary to claims that the legal institutions have exhibited "extraordinary resistance" to the implementation of the Act, case law indicates they have applied themselves diligently to the difficult task of interpreting inconsistent, incomplete and philosophically flawed bargaining provisions in an effort to develop a workable bargaining structure. Far from sabotaging the Act, they have en1erged as saviours of the bargaining system.
Neither does the case law support criticisms that the legal institutions have undermined the aims of Parliament by pursuing a minim.ah.st approach and by implying terms not expressed in the Act. Such claims are reactionary and transparently self-serving. There is nothing unusual about court intervention in contractual arrangements to ensure a fair and just outcome. As Lord Denning noted, "a man,s(sic) right to work is just as important to him, i. f not more important than his rights to property. Courts intervene every day to protect rights to property. They must intervene to protect the right to work" (Denning, 1979: 154) .
Claims that the institutions resorted to "judicial mysticism .. are likewise unfounded since there is nothing mysterious about the practice of implying tẽrms in the absence of any express provisions. This is a logical and legitimate legal process, for as Cooke concluded, "The inevitable duty of the Courts is to make law" (Cooke, 1990: 4) . Accordingly, in the absence of express statutory provisions, as is commonplace in the Act, the legal institutions had no option but to draw on past employment law precedents to resolve current legal problems.
Where £undamental rights and freedoms are under threat, legal institutions have historically turned to a wider context of statutory and international law to develop new law. This is progressive, not regressive. Thẽ crux of these criticisms is not that specialist legal institutions have failed to operate in line with Parliament,s intentions but rather, that their decisions did not accord with the economic agenda of their detractors.
Calls for the abolition of the specialist employment jurisdiction and a return to con1mon law and commonsense also fail to recognise that the specialist institutions have, in practice, adopted a "commonsense approach" developed by the highest court in the land, the Court of Appeal. Establishing a general jurisdiction for employment law would not provide the outcon1es sought by critics of specialist legal institutions. The common law of contract is dynamic and has long since progressed beyond classical principles of contract based on the shibboleths of freedom to contract and sanctity of contract. Modern courts of general jurisdiction no longer inflict legal rules that are out-moded and unjust. As Cooke observed, "the sad fact is that the Courts evolved a law of contract which was so unjust in its workings that the legislature had to correct it on a n1ajor scale, giving back the Courts a control which they should never have abandoned by self-imposed doctrine~~~ (Cooke, 1990: 2) .
While the Act created "new" lẽgal institutions, their role ren1ains fundamentaJly unchanged Progressively they have come fuH circle, reaffirming the conclusion reached by Pember Reeves over a century earlier, that judicial intervention is necessary to "fairly hold the scales between employer and employed 11 (Deeks, 1982: 24) . The specialist legal institutions have, contrary to the claim. s of their critics, succeeded to the extent that they have maintained a dynamic equilibrium where the scales of dissatisfaction are fairly evenly balanced. Unlike their predecessors, however, who had a statutory mandate to intervene, they continue to labour in "less than a fully certain and stable legal situation 111 (Goddard CJ, WEC 72/95). Reworking bargaining provisions is long overdue.
